

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

INFO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, ET

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SUMMARY. AT MEETING SEPTEMBER 19 IN NEW YORK ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZEWDE GEBRE-SELASSIE TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY EASUM THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO SEE SECRETARY TO ASK USG FOR ADDITIONAL GRANTS AND CREDITS IN THE MILITARY FIELD. ZEWDE WAS TOLD THAT APPOINTMENT WOULD BE SOUGHT BUT THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE OF A POSITIVE REPLY IN VIEW OF AFRICA CEILING AND HIGH PROPORTION UNDER THIS CEILING ALREADY GOING TO ETHIOPIA.

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ZEWDE ALSO DISCUSSED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT ETHIOPIAN SITUATION. HE SEEMED TO CONFIRM THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MADE AT LEAST A VAGUE OFFER OF ARMS AND THAT

THE AFCC WAS STILL CONSIDERING VARIOUS SOURCES FOR ADDITIONAL ARMS. END SUMMARY.

2. ETHIOPIAN AND/OR SOMALIA AS AN ISSUE AT UN: EASUM OPENED CONVERSATION BY ASKING ZEWDE IF HE THOUGHT THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI DISPUTE WOULD ARISE AT UNGA. ZEWDE SAID NOT UNLESS IT WAS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING TRIP TO NEW YORK OF PRESIDENT SIAD OF SOMALIA. ZEWDE EXPECTED SIAD TO COME IN OCTOBER PRIOR TO GOING TO ARAB LEAGUE MEETING IN MOROCCO.

3. SOMALI INTENTIONS: WHEN QUERIED ON RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA ZEWDE DISCOUNTED CURRENT VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ARMED ATTACK ON ETHIOPIA WHILE SIAD WAS CHAIRMAN OAU. HE DID NOT BELIEVE OAU CHAIRMANSHIP WAS SUCH AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. HE HAD FOLLOWED DEVELOPMENTS IN MOGADISCIO CLOSELY EVER SINCE HE HAD BEEN ETHIOPIA'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO SOMALIA IN 1960. HE KNEW THAT SOME SOMALI MILITARY DEFINITELY WANTED AN ATTACK NOW AND WERE TRYING TO PERSUADE SIAD TO TAKE THIS STEP. IF TEMPTATION BECAME STRONG ENOUGH THEY WOULD ATTACK, OAU CHAIRMANSHIP NOTWITHSTANDING. TEMPTATION WOULD BE STRONG IF AFCC CONTINUED TO ACT WITH INCREASING "EXTREMISM", AS THEY ARE DOING, AND THIS PRODUCED AN INTERNAL BREAKDOWN WITHIN COUNTRY, WHICH IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.

4. REQUEST FOR US ARMS: ZEWDE REVIEWED BACKGROUND OF ETHIOPIA'S REQUEST TO US FOR MORE ARMS. THERE WAS SERIOUS CONCERN OVER SOMALI MODERN WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY MIG 21'S. OLD REGIME HAD MADE THE REQUEST TO THE US AND CONSEQUENTLY UNDERSTOOD STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON US CAPACITY TO RESPOND (HOWEVER ZEWDE LATER ADMITTED IGNORANCE THAT THE 40 MILLION DOLLAR AFRICAN CEILING APPLIED TO BOTH GRANTS AND CREDITS). AFCC, HOWEVER, WAS NEVERTHELESS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF OLD REGIME FOR NEGLECTING ETHIOPIA'S DEFENSES IN FACE OF SOMALI BUILD-UP. EASUM POINTED OUT THAT ETHIOPIA HAD RECEIVED OVER 50

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PERCENT OF GRANT/CREDIT ASSISTANCE PERMITTED FOR AFRICA IN FY 74, LAST YEAR FOR WHICH COMPLETE FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE.

5. DEPOSITION AND TREATMENT OF HAILE SELASSIE: EASUM ASKED ZEWDE ABOUT EX-EMPEROR, NOTING THAT ANY HARSH TREATMENT COULD HAVE BAD REPERCUSSIONS IN VIEW OF HIS INTERNATIONAL PROMINENCE AND REPUTATION. ZEWDE SAID EMPEROR HAD CALLED HIM IN ON SEPTEMBER 10 AND HE HAD THEN WITNESSED HIS CONFRONTATION WITH AFCC. LATTER TOLD EMPEROR THEY UNDERSTOOD HE HAD CACHED MONEY ABROAD TO BE

USED FOR NATION IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY. IN VIEW DROUGHT AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES DIDN'T HE AGREE NOW WAS THE TIME TO REPATRIATE THESE FUNDS? EMPEROR DENIED SUCH HOLDINGS. AFCC THEN SUGGESTED THAT HE MAY HAVE MADE PROVISION ABROAD FOR HIS CHILDREN OR FOR HIMSELF. EMPEROR DENIED THIS ALSO, SAYING HE HAD NEVER EXPECTED TO GO INTO EXILE AND THAT SINCE HIS CHILDREN WERE GROWN HE HAD NO NEED TO PROVIDE FOR THEM. NEXT DAY, SEPT. 11, AFCC GAVE

OUT THE FALSE INFORMATION THAT EMPEROR HAD SAID HE HAD GIVEN ALL HIS MONEY TO HIS CHILDREN. ZEWDE COMMENTED AT THIS POINT THAT DURING THE 1960 COUP EMPEROR, IF HANDLED CORRECTLY, COULD HAVE BEEN PERSUADED TO TURN OVER HIS WEALTH TO THE GOVERNMENT. HE THOUGHT AFCC COULD HAVE SUCCEEDED IN THIS ALSO IF IT HAD PROCEEDED DIFFERENTLY.

6. ZEWDE WENT ON TO SAY THAT ON SEPT. 11, ETHIOPIAN NEW YEAR, IT WAS THE CUSTOM OF HAILE SELASSIE TO RECEIVE ALL VISITORS. AFCC HAD INFORMED ZEWDE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT THIS YEAR SOMEONE MIGHT USE THE OCCASION FOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. ZEWDE HAD REPLIED THAT SIMPLE SOLUTION TO PROBLEM WAS TO CANCEL CEREMONY AND THIS WAS DONE. ZEWDE HAD NEVERTHELESS CALLED ON EMPEROR TO PRESENT HIS RESPECTS AND FOUND EMPEROR DEPRESSED BUT LUCID. EMPEROR TOLD ZEWDE THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PRESIDE POWERLESS OVER THE DISINTEGRATION OF ETHIOPIA. IF AFCC WANTED HIM TO STEP DOWN AFTER THEY HAD STRIPPED HIM OF ALL AUTHORITY, IT WAS ALL RIGHT WITH HIM. ZEWDE THEN DEPLORED THE DEPOSITION AS HE

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DID AGAIN SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE CONVERSATION, SAYING IT WAS A BIG MISTAKE AND THAT AFCC SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS STEP. HE SAID THAT JUST THE REACTION OF SUDAN, WHICH HAS SUCH A LONG BORDER WITH ETHIOPIA, WAS IMPORTANT. HE DID NOT FURTHER ELABORATE ON THIS REMARK (WHICH WE FIND SOMEWHAT INTRIGUING IN VIEW OF HIS PASSAGE THROUGH KHARTOUM ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK). ACCORDING TO ONE STORY AFCC HAD HEARD THAT THE STUDENTS WOULD MEET ON SEPT. 16 TO DEMAND DEPOSITION AND CONSEQUENTLY DECIDED TO TAKE THIS STEP ITSELF BEFORE THE STUDENT DEMAND.

7. THE AFCC: IN RESPONSE TO EASUM'S QUESTION AS TO "WHO LEADS THE AFCC" ZEWDE PROFESSED IGNORANCE, NOTING THAT HE DID NOT KNOW IF AFCC REPRESENTATIVES HE MET WITH WERE THE TRUE LEADERS. JUST BEFORE GOING TO BRAZZAVILLE ON AUGUST 25 HE HAD INITIATED A MEETING WITH THE AFCC AND THERE HAD BEEN 23 OF THEM ACROSS THE TABLE, INCLUDING GEN. AMAN AND THE MAJOR GENERAL

COMMANDING THE TERRITORIAL FORCES, WHO, HE NOTED, WERE NOT REALLY AFCC MEMBERS. THE 23 INCLUDED TWO MAJORS, OFFICERS OF LESSER RANKS, AND NCO'S. ZEWDE DID NOT KNOW HOW MUCH INFLUENCE AMAN HAD OVER THEM. THEY SEEMED BADLY INFORMED. SOME OF THEM WERE PROBABLY QUITE RADICAL.

8. POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF SOVIET OR CHINESE ARMS:
ZEWDE HAD INITIATED THE ABOVE MENTIONED MEETING WITH AFCC REPRESENTATIVES TO WARN THEM THAT THEY SHOULD THINK OVER CAREFULLY ANY IDEAS THEY MIGHT HAVE ABOUT OBTAINING ARMS FROM THE USSR OR THE PRC AND TO CONSIDER CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A STEP. HE TOLD THEM THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH THEM AFTER HIS RETURN FROM BRAZZAVILLE TO DISCUSS SUBJECT FURTHER. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THEY VISIT COUNTRIES SUCH AS EGYPT, TANZANIA, AND SUDAN TO DISCUSS THOSE GOVERNMENT'S EXPERIENCES WITH SOVIET AID. BUT WHEN HE RETURNED FROM BRAZZAVILLE HE FOUND AFCC BUSY WITH "OTHER THINGS" (DEPOSITION) AND IN SPITE OF HIS REPEATED EFFORTS THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER MEETING TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AND NO VISITS AS HE HAD SUGGESTED.

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9. ZEWDE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO EASUM'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD ACTUALLY OFFERED TO SUPPLY ARMS. HE MERELY SHRUGGED AND SAID: "YOU KNOW HOW THE SOVIETS ARE. THEY MAKE GENERAL ASSURANCES AND THEN BACK OFF WHEN IT IS TIME FOR CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS." HE HAD TOLD AFCC IT WOULD TAKE A WHILE TO SHIFT OVER TO SOVIET ARMS, THEREFORE THEY WOULD NOT MEET ETHIOPIA'S IMMEDIATE NEEDS. AS TO OTHER SUPPLIERS ZEWDE HAD TOLD AFCC THAT ETHIOPIA'S ACQUISITION OF CHINESE ARMS WOULD NOT ALARM US ANYWHERE NEAR SO MUCH AS THE SOVIETS, WHO WOULD REACT AT THE VERY LEAST BY FURTHER ARMING THE SOMALIS, THUS MAINTAINING THE PRESENT UNFAVORABLE ARMS RATIO. BESIDES THE CHINESE MUCH PREFERRED ECONOMIC AID, THE BUILDING OF ROADS OR RAILWAYS, TO SUPPLYING MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

10. SOVIET-SOMALI RELATIONS: WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE RESTRAINING THE SOMALIS, ZEWDE OPINED THAT USSR MIGHT NOT WANT A SOMALI ATTACK ON ETHIOPIA AND MIGHT LIMIT FOLLOW-UP SUPPLIES IF IT OCCURRED BUT THAT IT PROBABLY CANNOT PREVENT AN INITIAL ATTACK AND IS UNWILLING TO TRY.

11. ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND POSTURE IN THE UN:
QUESTIONED ON THE UN ZEWDE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE NEW REGIME WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES IN ETHIOPIAN POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES AS CAMBODIA AND KOREA. AT THE LATE AUGUST

MEETING HE HAD SUGGESTED TO AFCC THAT IT PUT OUT A FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT. AFCC HAD MADE ONE UP, WITHOUT ASKING

HIS CONTRIBUTION OR ADVICE, BUT DID NOT ISSUE IT. THE STATEMENT ISSUED ON SEPT 13 WAS VERY SIMILAR BUT LEFT OUT A REFERENCE TO ETHIOPIAN "SOCIALISM" CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL UNISSUED STATEMENT. AFCC CONTENDS OLD REGIME JUST PAID LIP SERVICE TO NON- ALIGNMENT, WHICH WOULD NOW BECOME A POLICY OF ACTION. THIS MIGHT MEAN A CHANGE IN ETHIOPIAN POSITION ON SOME ISSUES. HOWEVER, ZEWDE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS AND INTENDED TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT UNLESS ORDERED TO DO OTHERWISE. IF HE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAKE EXTREMELY
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RADICAL POSITIONS, HE WOULD RESIGN.

12. MORE OF AFCC: ZEWDE WAS CRITICAL OF AFCC THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION. THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE THE FIRST ETHIOPIAN REFORMERS. HE HAD TOLD THEM THEY WERE NOT AND THAT THEY WERE WRONG TO ASSUME THAT US AND WEST IN GENERAL HAD BEEN COMMITTED TO OLD REGIME. THE US AND INTERNATIONAL AID DONORS HAD BEEN TRYING FOR YEARS TO GET ETHIOPIA TO MAKE NEEDED CHANGES. MR. McNAMARA HAD CONDITIONED CERTAIN IBRD PROJECTS ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF LAND REFORM. ZEWDE THOUGHT THAT AFCC WAS SURPRISED AND PLEASED BY ITS SUCCESS SO FAR AND THAT SOME OF ITS MEMBERS MAY HAVE BECOME INTOXICATED BY EASY RESULTS THAT HAD COME ABOUT. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT AS A RESULT THEY WOULD TAKE MORE EXTREME ACTION. THIS COULD MEAN TROUBLE, FOR ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO PUBLIC REACTION SO FAR, THIS DID NOT MEAN IT COULD NOT STILL MATERIALIZE. AFCC COULD NOT GO ON EXERCISING POWER BUT REFUSING RESPONSIBILITY. IF IT WANTED TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING, IT WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME THE LATTER AS WELL AS THE FORMER AND UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT SETUP THIS MIGHT HAPPEN.

13. REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY OF STATE ON US ARMS: ZEWDE SAID HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY ISSUE OF US ARMS SUPPLIES, AND WAS WILLING TO MEET HIM IN N.Y. OR WASHINGTON. HE WAS UNDER ORDERS TO SAY THAT IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS OF DROUGHT AND ECONOMIC HARSHSHIP IT WOULD LOOK BAD FOR THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT TO SPEND ITS OWN MONEY FOR ARMS. THEREFORE US WAS REQUESTED TO MAKE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MORE GRANTS AND CREDITS. HE NEEDED TO KNOW SOON WHETHER THIS COULD BE DONE AS HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED AN EARLY REPORT FROM HIM SO IT COULD FURTHER CONSIDER WHOLE PROBLEM OF ITS MILITARY NEEDS.

14. EASUM SAID IN REPLY THAT HE WOULD RELAY MINISTER'S REQUEST TO SECRETARY, BUT THAT THIS WAS A SUBJECT ON WHICH HE COULD GET A REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY EVEN BEFORE A MEETING. HE WOULD DO SO BUT EVEN BEFORE THAT HE COULD TELL THE MINISTER THAT HE SAW NO CHANCE OF
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ANY FURTHER MILITARY GRANTS OR CREDITS. THE 40 MILLION DOLLAR AFRICA CEILING WAS FIRM. THERE WAS PRESENTLY NO POSSIBILITY FOR EXCEPTIONS TO IT, AND IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT AUTHORITY FOR EXCEPTIONS TO IT WOULD BE VOTED BY THE CONGRESS.

15. POSSIBILITY OF THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE: WHEN EASUM ASKED IF ETHIOPIA COULD NOT GET THIRD COUNTRY FINANCING FOR ITS CASH PURCHASES OF US ARMS UNDER THE 53 MILLION DOLLARS AUTHORIZED, ZEWDE MANIFESTED EXTREME SKEPTICISM. HE REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH AND SAID IN HIS OPINION IRAN WOULD BE WILLING UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES TO GIVE ETHIOPIA F5A'S OR F5E'S. BUT THE SHAH WANTED TO KNOW WHO HE WOULD BE ARMING: FRIENDS OR POSSIBLE FUTURE ENEMIES. THIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE. IT WAS FOR THIS SAME REASON THAT ZEWDE WAS UNWILLING TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. HE WOULD BE ASKED THE SAME QUESTION AND WOULD HAVE TO REPLY HONESTLY, IN VIEW OF AFCC'S INCREASING EXTREMISM, THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER.

16. ETHIOPIAN STUDENTS' DIFFICULTIES IN THE US: AS EASUM LEAVING ZEWDE, REFERRING TO A PAPER LEFT WITH HIM BY ETHIOPIAN CONSULATE, SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT AT PRESENT FOR ETHIOPIAN PARENTS TO SEND MONEY TO THEIR CHILDREN STUDYING IN UNITED STATES AND THAT LATTER COULD NOT GET JOBS TO EARN MONEY. HE ASKED WHETHER USG COULD DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. EASUM REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WITH STUDENTS FROM SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THAT THE MATTER WAS BEING STUDIED BY STATE AND INS, AND THAT THE CONCERNED AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING THE ETHIOPIAN, WOULD BE APPRISED OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY.

17. MISCELLANEOUS AND COMMENT: ZEWDE WAS UNACCOMPANIED BY ANY OF HIS STAFF AT THIS MEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE AT HIS FORMER OFFICE IN NEW YORK AND SEEMED TO BE SPEAKING WITH NO RESTRAINT. HE WONDERED ALOUD SEVERAL

TIMES AT THE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY GENERAL AMAN. HE MET OFTEN WITH AMAN BUT COULD NOT MEASURE HIS INFLUENCE
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ON AFCC. AMAN USED TO BE BITTER AGAINST THE US OVER
EVENTS IN KOREA BUT NOW SEEMED MORE REASONABLE; HOWEVER,
HE SEEMED TO HAVE LOST TOUCH WITH THE ARMY IN THE NINE
YEARS HE HAD BEEN OUT OF IT. WE INTERPRET ZEWDE'S
REPLY ON THE SOVIET MILITARY AID OFFER TO MEAN THAT
THERE HAS BEEN SOME INDICATION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS
TO SUPPLY ARMS. KISSINGER

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